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Tuning and Conformity of Inventory InvestmentCycles
iProblems of Measurement
The rate of investment by manufacturers in theircommodity stocks
may be estimatedin two ways. If series showing the number of
units of each commodity held in stock at theend of each period
were available, we couldvalue the change in the number of units
of each commodity between the end of oneperiod and the next
either by its cost in the period in question, or if wewished to elimi-
nate the influence of price changes,by its cost in some standard
period. The aggregate value of the changes in stock forall com-
modities would be the figure needed.
Alternatively, if one has the values of the inventoriesheld by
manufacturers at the end of stated intervals, corrected toeliminate
the effects of price changes, the difference betweenthe corrected
values held at the end of successive vak gives the number of
dollars spent by manufacturers to add goods totheir stocks, the
commodities so added being uniformly valued at their costin some
standard period. One may then revalue the investmentin each
interval to take account of changes in prices betweenthe base
period and each given period.
KUZNETS' ESTIMATES
The method we follow is dictated by the material.Estimates of the
value of inventories held by manufacturers at theend of each year
1918-38, based on Kuznets' original work, werecorrected for
changes in the value of inventory units.1 Thedifference in these
values, corrected for price changes, is ourfundamental measure
of the rate of inventory investment. Since the correctedvalues of
1Thc construction of these estimates and the methodsused in correcting for
price changes are described in Chapter 4 and in greaterdetail in Appendix A.336 CHAPTER FOURTEEN
inventory at the end of each year show the amount the stock
would have cost if purchased in 1929, the change in value between
year ends is the cost of the current investment in inventory when
the goods added to stock are valued at their 1929 prices.
While the estimates in book values and their correction for
changes in price have been described in other chapters, one mat-
ter deserves repetition. Some manufacturers value uwentones at
original cost, others at the lower of original cost or the cost of re-
placement. In correcting for changes in prices some assumption
must be made about the prevalence of these practices. Since I be-
lieve that the 'cost or market' method is more common, my figures
for inventory investment are based upon price corrections thatas-
sume that all manufacturers used this method. As a check against
this extreme assumption, I used a second set of figures basedupon
another extreme assumption: that as much as half the total stock
is valued at cost alone and never revalued when the market price
is below cost (App. A, Sec. 2D). Except in the years of violent
price disturbance 1919-22, they do not differ materially. Indeed,
my observations about the tendency of the rate of inventory invest-
ment to move up and down with business in general would not be
altered even if inventories were universally valuedat original cost
(see Chart 63). This was, to be sure, not thecase in the years of
large price movements following World War I. In thatperiod,
however, the assumption that inventoriesare always valued at cost
yields implausible results. It suggests that therewas a net liquida-
tion of stocks during 1920, the peakyear of the postwar boom, and
a rapid accumulation during 1921 when businessmenwere strug-
gling to rid their shelves of goods. The dataI use, therefore, are
calculated on the assumption that all stocksare valued at the lower
of cost or market price.
The difficulties inherent in correctinginventory values for
changes in prices are, of course, magnified whenwe turn from the
level of inventories in differentyears to the rate of growth and de-
cline in stocks, for smallerrors in the value of stocks at the ends of
successive years can producea large error in the inventory change
during the intervening period. Addto this the errors that arise
from measuring cyclical behaviorwith annual data and it will
readily be seen that the problemsare formidable. It is especiallyTIMING ANDCONFORMITY OF INVESTMENT CYCLES 337
important, in using these data, to confine oneself to conclusions
that apply to manufacturing as a whole based upon a clear con-
sensus of the behavior of the various industry groups, and even
then to avoid observations about details.
2Manufacturers' Inventory Investment
Does inventory investment typically help to initiate the revivals
and recessions of busmess? We can cast some light on this question
if we know whether inventory investment reaches its peaks and
troughs before or after business activity and whether it does so
regularly. To discover this is the purpose of the timing and con-
formity measures presented in this section. Of course, the refer-
ence cycle turning dates are only benchmarks. But against these
benchmarks, the timing relations of inventory investment to other
crucial series may be judged.
Using the Kuznets estimates for ten large industry groups and
for manufacturing as a whole, we compare the timing of the
turns in inventory investment with those in business cycles and
measure their conformity. To measure the timing of cyclical turns
we use the National Bureau standard method for annual series.
The midpoints of the years when the specific cycle turns in inven-
tory investment occur arc compared with the months in which
the corresponding reference turns occur. The lead or lag is meas-
ured in months and averaged for all the turns at which compari-
sons can be made. Since the midpoint of the year in which a series
reaches a specific cycle peak or trough is, of course, highly unlikely
to be a good approximation to the actual date at which the series
turns, any individual observation of relative timing will be in
error by a larger or smaller nunther of months. The validity of the
method, therefore, depends upon whether an average can elimi-
nate a considerable part of this inaccuracy by offsetting the errors
of single observations. As explained in Chapter 3, the method
yields crude but useful results if based on many observations and
confined to the broad features of the measures.
The timing measures do not provide a valid basis for supposing
that inventory investment by manufacturers tends either to lead or
to lag behind business cycle tunis. The average lag for total manu-
facturing is only0.2months. An average based on all 86 timing338 CHAPTER FOURTEEN
comparisons also yields a negligible lag. There are only i o more
lags than leads, an excess of only twelve percent. In only 4 of the
10 groups was the average lead orlag longer thanmonths. Of
these, 2 were leads and 2 lags. I conclude that if inventory invest-
ment tends either to lead or to lag at business cycle turns, the aver-
age lead or lag is short, probably nolonger than 3 months, an in-
terval too short to be measured reliably by annual data.
A second observation is based on the number of timing compari.
scrns in Table 6i. Our data, running from 1919 to 1939 (except
for miscellaneous manufacturing which ends in 1937), cover it
business cycle turns. But since we do not have any way of knowing
whether the rate of investment in 1919 was higher or lower than
in 1918, comparisons are not made at the initial business cycle
trough. For the ten industry groups 99 timing comparisons were
possible, and of these, 86 comparisons could actually be made
evidence of the regularity with which the rate of inventory invest-
ment by manufacturers rises and falls with general business. For if
a series skips a cycle, two possible comparisons are eliminated, and
if it moves through an extra cycle, a comparison must often be dis-
carded because of uncertainty in determining which of two spe.
TABLE 6i
Investment in Manufacturers' Inventories, Constant Prices





Total manufacturing 4 6 +0.2
Food, beverages & tobacco 5 +3.9
Textiles & textile products* 2 5 oB
Leather & leather products 3 7 +2.6
Rubber & related products 4 -0.5
Lumber & wood products 2 7 +4.1
Paper, printing & publishing 3 7 +2.6
Chemicals & allied products 7 0 7.6
Stone, clay & glass products 7 -I- t. Metals & metal products 3 6 +o.6
Miscellaneous 8 o
Sum of io groups 38 48
Av. of io groups weighted by
no. of turns +0.14
* One lead was excluded because it exceeded24.5 months.TIMING ANDCONFORMiTY OF INVESTMENT CYCLES
cific cycle turns should be matched with a given reference cycle
turn. And the same sort of uncertainty arises in heightened degree
if the series merely behaves irregularly. The large number of actual
comparisons relative to the number possible provides a first indica-
tion of the conformity of inventory investment to business cycles.
Moreover, it increases the reliance that can be put on our timing
measures.
That inventory investment by manufacturers tends to conform
positively to business cycles can be seen also from Chart 63. Two
estimates of the rate of investment are shown: one based on the
assumption that inventories are valued at the lower of cost or mar-
ket price more nearly corresponds to reality; the other on the as-
sumption that inventories are never marked down when prices
fall. Under the first assumption, the rate of inventory investment
by manufacturers was higher in every peak year of business than in
adjacent trough years, and lower in every trough year than in ad-
jacent peak years. In short, inventory investment rose during every
expansion and declined during every contraction of business. Not
only that, but its amplitude is roughly of the same size as that of
business swings. The violent contraction of 1920-21 and the vigor-
ous recovery of 1921-23 stand out plainly. The rate of investment
dropped precipitously during the mild business contraction of
Chart 63
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1923-24, but its movcments wcrc small during the mild cycle of
1924-27 and large again during the two violent business cycles that
followed.
These intimations of systematic response to business cyclesare
fully confirmed by measures of conformity, made on the same plan
as those used in Chapters 4 and 5 in connection with the level of
stocks. There are, however, minor differences of procedure arising
from the fact that our data are now calendar year, rather than end
of year, series. Instead of comparing the movements of the invest-
ment data with a chronology based on the ends of years when busi-
ness reached peaks and troughs, we use the National Bureau regu-
lar chronology of the calendar years when businesswas at peaks
and troughs. This is our practice for series thatmove more or less
synchronously. If a series has a pronounced lag, about sixmonths,
its movements are compared with the National Bureaufiscal year
chronology. We say, in effect, that if an annual seriestends to lag
six months, it ought to rise and fall in conjunction withan annual
chronology of business for years ending six monthsearlier. If a
series leads by about six months, we stilluse the National Bureau
fiscal year chronology, but predate itone year. Special business
chronologies were prepared for series leadingor lagging by three
TABLE 62
Investment in Manufacturers' Inventories,Constant Prices
Conformity to Business Cycles,1918-1938
From Table 6i, col.4. Figures are rounded to the nearest 3-month interval.









Conir. Cyck (i) (z)()() () (6)
Total manufacturing o so + 100 + 100 +100
Food, beverages & tobacco +3 so +20 +20 + Ii
Textiles & textile products o so +20 +6o +56
Leather & leather products+3 so + soo +6o +56 Rubber & related products 0 so +6o + 100 +500
Lumber & wood products +3 10 +6o 4- soo 4-ioo
Paper, printing & publishing+3 so 4-206o
Chemicals & allied products- g -4-50 + 500 + 500
Stone, clay & glass products 0 so +6o+ ioo + 500 Metals & metal products 0 so +6o +6o +56 Miscellaneous g g +50+100 +100TIMING ANDCONFORMITY OF IN VESTMENT CYCLES
or nine months.2By following the average timing measures of
Table 6i, rounding the figures to the nearest 3-month interval, I
distinguish between series that run synchronously with business
cycles and those that tend to lead or lag. The measure itself is
simple and has been fully explained in Chapters 3 and 4.
The movements of manufacturers' inventory investment coin-
cide with the movements of business far more regularly than do
stocks themselves (Table 62). The conformity of the total is per-
fect and five of the ten groups have full cycle indexes of+ 100.
Only two fall below+50,and one of these is the only negative in-
dex in this column. We may conclude that inventory investment
by manufacturers as a whole responds to business cycles in a highly
systematic fashion, as far as the direction of its movement is con-
cerned. When business gets better, the rate of investment rises;
when the tide of business recedes, the rate of investment declines.
There is little difference between the behavior of manufacturers'
inventory investment measured in constant prices and in current
prices (Chart 64).
chart 64
Total Manufacturers' Inventory Investment
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2See Ch.for a fuller description of the Burcau'sconformity measures and
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3Inventory Investment in Manufacturing and Other
Industrial Divisions
As in our study of stock levels, I digress at this point to compare
the timing and conformity of manufacturets' inventory invest..
ments with those in mining, transportation and other public util-
ities, trade, and farming (Table 63 and Chart 65). Some 95 per-
cent of all commercial stocks are held by these five groups.
TABLE 63
Total Inventory Investment and Its Major Components,
Constant Prices
Timing and Conformity, 1919-1939
A TIMING AT BUSINESS CYCLE TURNS
ÀY. LEAD ()
NUMBER OF OR LAG (+)
LeadsLags MONTHS
Totala 5 5 2.2
Total nonagricultural' 6 + 0.2
Manufacturing 4 6 +0.2
Trade 5 5 -1.0
Transp. & other pub. Ut. 1 6 +4.5
Mining&quarrying o 6 +6.5
Mining & quarrying
(inverted)b 8 2 8.3
Agriculture 2 3 + 1.5
B CONFORMITY TO BUSINESS CYCLES
LEAD(-)
OR LAO (+)
ASSUMED INDEX OF CONFORMITY TO
(Mo.) Exp. Contr. Cycle
Total' 3 +100+100+100
Total nonagricultural' o + 100 + 100 + 100
Manufacturin5 0 + 100 + 100 + 100
Trade o +100+100+100
Transp. & other pub. Ut.'+6 + 100 + 100 + 100
Mining & quarrying +6 +50 + 100 +7!
Mining & quarrying 6' -50 -50-100
Agriculture o + 6o + 20 +11
'Includes construction, finance, and miscellaneous.
Timing measured invertedly: specific cycle peaks are matched with refer-
ence troughs, troughs with reference peaks.
The indexes would be the same if the lag assumed were 3 months.
Once again the resemblance between the manufacturing and
trade divisions is marked. Both tend to move up and down with
general business, and neither leads or lags consistently. At some
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ment by distributors; at other turns the reverse is true. In both
cases, however, the behavior of these annual data is consistent with
the view that the monthly rate of investment turns near business
cycle peaks and troughs. These observations are confirmed by
Table 63 which indicates that inventory investment in trade led
at five business cycle turns, lagged at the same number, and yielded
an average lead that is not significant since it is based on annual
figures. Assuming synchronous behavior, the conformity of this
category of investment to business cycles is perfect.
Inventory investment in transportation and public utilities, on
the contrary, apparently lags behind business cycles. Lags pre-
dominatc 6 toiover leads, and thc average timing measures
suggest a lag of 4.5 months. If we assume a lag of 6 months, the
conformity measure indicates perfect agreement in direction of
movement between business cycles and inventory investment.
The relation between business cycles and investment in the min-
ing and quarrying industries may be described as inverted with a
long lead about as well as positive with a long lag (Table 63).
Thus if the peaks in inventory investment are compared with busi-
ness cycle peaks, and troughs with troughs, six comparisons are
possible, in all of which investment lags. If specific cycle troughs
are matched with business cycle peaks, ten comparisons are pos-
sible: stocks lead in eight, lag in two. On the one basis, stocks ap-
pear to lag 6 months on the average; on the other, they appear to
lead by 8 months. The larger number of comparisons that can be
made when the series is analyzed invertedly suggest, as far as it
goes, that this is the better basis. But the margin is not large and
conformity measures on the two bases leave little to choose between
theni. However we express the relation, one thing is clear: when
business turns down, inventory investment in thisgroup, as in the
public utility group, typically continues to rise fora considerable
number of months. It begins to fall while contraction still hassome
months to run. It continues to fall after business has turnedup but
begins to rise well before the onset of recession.
Not unexpectedly, the rate of growth and liquidation of stocks
in farming behaves irregularly during business cycles. Since short
run supply is governed by harvests, it cannot be any surprise that
farmers' stocks sometimes rise and sometimes fall in goodyears.1919 '20 21'22 '23 '24 '25 '26 '27 '28 '29 '30 '31'3233 '34 '35 '36 '37 38
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4Significance of the Timing of Inventory Investment Cycles
This review of the data clearly establishes one facet of the role of
inventory investment in business cycles. Increases in inventory in-
a
'yjjNGAND CONFORMITY OF INVESTMENT CYCLES
The behavior of total inventory investment, both including and
excluding farm stocks, is dominated by the movements of manu-
facturing and trade. The totals, therefore, rise and fall with busi-
neand do not show any tendency to lead or lag that can be con-
sidered significant in view of the fact that the data are annual. And
again, there is little difference, as far as timing and conformity go,
between total investment measured in constant and in current
prices (Chart 66).
Chart 66
Total Inventory Investment, Current and Constant Prices
Total
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vestment regularly act to augment the forces of expansion from
about the very beginning of the upward swing of business until
approximately its very end. And declines in inventory investment
augment the forces of contraction in the same way. The extent to
which such investment intensifies the cyclical movements of the
economy is, of course, another matter. This is a question of the
magnitude of the fluctuations in inventory investment, studied in
Chapter 2!.
What the data leave obscure is the precise influence of inventory
investment near the turning points of business cycles. Is it true that
one reason for the turns in aggregate output is the desire of busi-
nessmen to increase the rate at which they are accumulating or
liquidating stocks? The difficulty arises first because annual data
are too coarse to establish the timing of cyclical turns except within
a range of about six months. If we say, therefore, that annual data
indicate that inventory investment tends to turn near reference
turns, we do not exclude the possibility of a tendency to lead or lag
behind the reference turns by as much as3 months. Taking the
data as they stand, therefore, we cannot say whether the begin-
nings of expansion and contraction in production are due in part
to the turns in inventory investment or not.
For our purposes, however, we cannot accept the dataas they
stand. As already indicated (Ch.4, Sec.in adjusting the esti-
mates of inventory investment for changes in prices, the indexes
used fluctuate more violently than accurate indexes of inventory
cost per unit would do. Consequently, the price-corrected value of
inventories at the end of peak years, when prices have already be-
gun to decline, probably tends to be somewhat higher than it
should be compared with its value at the beginning ofthe year.
Similarly at the end of troughyears, the price-corrected value of
stocks probably tends to be too low. The result isan overestimate
of inventory investment in peakyears of business and an under-
estimate in trough years. And this is thesame as saying that the
true turning points in inventory investment probablycome a little
earlier than our estimates indicate.
A final element of ambiguity is that theobserved levels of inven-
tory investment mclude some quantities ofunplanned accumula-
tion or liquidation of stocks. Thisis especially important at thepeaks and troughs of business. The analysis in Part Two has shown
that the bulk of inventories (as distinct from inventory invest-
ment) tend to lag behind the turns of business by varying inter-
vals. For the most part, the explanation appears to lie in a failure
of businessmen to anticipate cyclical turns in demand far enough
in advance to make sufficiently prompt and adequate adjustments
in their purchases and production. In other words, immediately
following a peak in business there occurs an unplannedaccumu-
lation of stocks, and inunediately after a trough an unplanned
liquidation. This, in turn, means that annual data on inventory
investment in peak years of business are somewhat higher than
they would be if they measured planned investment; in trough
years they are lower. Planned investment in inventories probably
turns somewhat earlier than actual investment, and actual invest-
ment a little earlier than our estimates indicate. On the basis of this
analysis it seems reasonable to take the provisional position that
the beginnings of recession and recovery in production are,as a
rule, due in part to changes in planned inventory investment. But
not until accurate monthly or quarterly data have been available
for a considerable period can this provisional position becon-
finned.
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